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Abstract—Because of the nature of wireless channels, Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETs) are vulnerable against many 
threats and attacks. Beside of this, the mobility of the network nodes made the security of routing protocols one of the most 
interesting research areas over Ad-Hoc networks. Moreover,  Rushing attack became one of the common attacks against routing 
protocols in MANETs. Although there are many researches over Rushing attacks, the security research community suffers from 
a famine of evidence to present the exact position of this kind of attacks in MANETs clearly. Therefore, we paid particular 
attention to this issue to clarify the position of Rushing attacks against routing protocols and the functionality of this category of 
attacks. We hope that our document be useful for other researchers in understanding mentioned issue in face with this class of 
attacks.  
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I. .INTRODUCTION
In the recent years, many researchers worked on the area of security in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETs). The main 
reason is that providing security for these networks is a very challenging issue due to their specific features. The main 
property of MANETs is that there is not any fixed infrastructure in these sort of networks, so all nodes should work 
together to keep the network integrated. Thus, many significant network functions such as routing must be run by the 
existing nodes. It can be claimed that this function is one of the most significant ones that made the this kind of networks a 
prone one to be vulnerable against many security attacks.  
There are many protocols that try to handle the issue of routing in MANETs. In general, routing protocols for 
MANETs can be classified into two categories; “Periodic Protocols” and “On-demand Protocols.”  Although these 
protocols help the MANETs work easily, but they are weak against many attacks that we introduced them in section 4.  
On-demand routing protocols such as ODMRP [1] and MAODV [2] use duplicate suppression technique to prevent 
flooding. It means that if the source node that needs to find the path to the destination, floods the network with the route 
discovery packets, existing intermediate nodes will process only the first non-duplicate packet and will drop the other 
duplicate ones. By the use of the Rushing attack, the attacker tries to abuse this feature by sending the route 
discovery packets quickly to gain access to the forwarding group.  
Since, Rushing attacks occur against routing protocols in Ad-Hoc networks, we assigned the background of the main 
issue to the first and the second sections of this paper. We presented an overview on mobile Ad-Hoc networks in section 2. 
Then in section 3, we focused on existing routing protocols in MANETs. In continue to what mentioned in section3, we 
introduced possible attacks against routing protocols and classified them in two groups in section4. The main achievement 
of this section is to determine the position of the subject “Rushing attacks” in the “Attack against routing 
protocols” scientific topic. In the next section, we concluded Rushing attack’s functionality as an instance of Routing-
disruption attacks. Actually, by the use of simple examples we demonstrated that Rushing attacks can be investigated in 
three scenarios based on the attacker’s position. 
To solve mentioned problems, many researchers tried to present secure protocols against Rushing attacks. Although those 
protocols are safe in some situations, they are not the best way to prevent this kind of attacks. Based on our studies, 
there are three methods which are mentioned in part 6. These methods can be used as a part of any protocol oreven can be 
combined together as a protocol to be able to prevent Rushing attacks in MANETs.  
II. MOBILE AD-HOC NETWORKS
MANETs are one of the important categories of wireless communicating networks. These networks have special 
characteristics that made the use of them easy, but vulnerable against many threats and attacks. Some of the 
significant criteria are investigated as follow for this class of networks: 
• Network Infrastructure. Base on this property, MANETs do not have any fixed infrastructure. 
Therefore, all the nodes work together to perform the network functions (such as routing) by multihopping 
approach [3,4].  
• Self-Organization. Due to the running of the network functions by the means of existing nodes, MANETs are self-
organized. It is worth mentioning that the nodes inside a mobile Ad-Hoc network must be able to determine their configuration 
parameters [5]. 
• Mobility. This property emphasizes on this fact that the nodes are able to repositioning themselves or leave the 
network at any time [5]. 
• Multihopping. Because of running network functions by the use of existing nodes in such a multihopping 
network, the path from source to destination traverses several other nodes [5].  
• Network Topology. The Network Topology is random, dynamic and unpredictable. The reason is that existing 
nodes are mobile and can change their position easily. In addition, wireless connections are temporary and error prone that 
makes the topology weakly connected [3,6]. 
• Scalability. Mobile Ad-Hoc networks can easily grow even to thousands of nodes [5]. 
• Resource limitations. MANETs suffer from the traditional resource problems in wireless and mobile networks 
such as bandwidth optimization, power control, and transmission-quality enhancement, etc. [6,7]. 
• Security. The wireless nature of communicating channels made MANETs unsecure. More precisely, the 
active and passive adversaries can eavesdrop or spoof the channel. As a result, MANETs are assailable much 
more than the traditional fixed-infrastructure networks  [3,4,5]. 
III. ROUTING PROTOCOLS
Due to the special characteristics of mobile Ad-Hoc networks (e.g. the dynamic nature, limited resources, etc.) it is 
very difficult to design routing protocols especially from security viewpoint. 
In continue to what mentioned above, it seems that routing protocols in Ad-Hoc networks must be highly 
optimized to delegate new routing information as quickly as changing the conditions. Moreover, it seems that 
interactions between the nodes must be faster and more frequent than they are in the traditional wired networks. 
One of the most important drawbacks of routing protocols in this category of networks is that security mechanisms are not 
lightweight and appropriate for resource-constrained nodes. Mentioned drawback can cause some problems such as 
making delay or preventing exchanges of routing information. These problems can lead to reducing routing 
effectiveness, consuming network or node resources extremely, leading too many new opportunities for possible 
Denial-of-Service attacks through the routing protocol, etc. 
In continue to mentioned background above, it can be claimed that all routing protocols in Ad-Hoc networks are 
placed into one of the two main categories as follow [8]:  
Periodic Protocols. In this kind of protocols, any node exchange routing information to the other ones periodically in 
order to make each node aware of current routes to all destinations [9,10,11].  
On-demand Protocols. In this kind of protocols, any node tries to exchange routing information in order to pass the 
received data packet during the need to discover a route [1,2,12,13]. 
It is worth noting that beside of two mentioned categories, there are some routing protocols, which are a 
hybrid model of Periodic and On-demand ones (for more details, refer to [14]). 
IV. ATTACKS AGAINST ROUTING PROTOCOLS IN MANET
This section classifies and introduces possible attacks against mentioned routing protocols in the previous section. These 
attacks can be classified into two followed categories [15, 16]:  
• Routing-disruption attacks. In  this  kind  of  attacks, the attacker tries to act in such a way that seems actual data packets 
were directed in a dysfunctional path. Some example of these attacks are mentioned as follow: 
• Rushing: In this attack which is against On-demand routing protocols, an attacker distributes ROUTE REQUESTS 
quickly throughout the network. Consequently, existing nodes will drop any original legitimate ROUTE REQUESTS, 
because of the duplicate suppression rule in those protocols. 
• Resource-consumption attacks. In this category of attacks, the attacker adds extra packets into the network to waist 
essential network resources such as bandwidth, etc. Moreover, the attacker sometimes tries to consume the node 
resources such as memory or computation power.  
Next section investigates the Rushing attack as a Routing-disruption attack.  
V. RUSHING ATTACKS
Rushing attacks, which can be assigned to the Routing-disruption attacks are against On-demand routing protocols such 
as ODMRP [1], MAODV [2], FGMP [12], and ADMR [13]. The significant vulnerability of these protocols is that they use 
duplicate suppression method in their operations. If roughly speaking, when a source node floods the network with the route 
discovery packets to find the destination path, intermediate nodes only process the first non-duplicate packet and drop 
the other ones. In a Rushing attack, the attacker tries to use the duplicate suppression by quickly forwarding the route 
discovery packets to gain access to the forwarding group.  
The Rushing attack can act as an effective Denial-Of-Service attack against all currently proposed On-demand 
MANET routing protocols [17,18]. The next subsection, investigates this attack based on the different positions of the 
attacker. 
A. Different Scenarios of Rushing Attacks
In this section, we are going to describe Rushing attacks based on the attacker’s position. As we will see, this issue is 
explained through some simple examples. The three possible scenarios are as followed [17,18,19]: 
Rushing node near the Sender node 
In this scenario as illustrated in the Figure 1, the sender, “S” sends the packets to receiver, “R” as the destination 
node. In addition, the attacker “A” is located near the “S.” Thus, at the same time packets can be forwarded to both 
nodes “A” and “C,” which is another neighbor of the “S”. Therefore, the attacker “A” can forward the packets to the node 
“E” faster than the node “C” and the rout will be completed with “G,” “B” and finally the receiver “R.” As a result, “R” 
receives the data packets, which are forwarded by the attacker node [17,19]. 
Figure 1.  Rushing attacker near the sender [17,19] 
• Gray hole: This attack is similar to the blackhole attack, but the attacker drops the packets selectively. 
• Gratuitous detour: In this attack, an attacker adds virtual nodes to the route to make the path longer than what it 
is.  
• Wormhole: In this kind of attack, a pair of attackers use a tunnel channel through a private network connection. 
Obviously, they can distribute existing packets faster than normal cases in a multi-hop route. As a result, tunneling the 
routing control message can disrupt the routing algorithm. 
• Blackhole: An attacker in a blackhole attack distributes fake routing information (like, claiming falsified short 
distance information) to attract the traffic. This attacker then drops the data packets. 
Figure 2.  Rushing attacker near the receiver [17,19]
Figure 3.  Rushing attacker at anywhere within the network [17,19] 
After that the Sender node “S” sends data packets through the specified path, the other forwarding nodes can pass 
the packets to the next neighbor. Then, the attacker “A” taps the entire packets. As a result, the attacker can quickly forward 
the packets to the intermediate nodes and the path 
Rushing node near the Receiver node 
As it is depicted in the Figure 2, in the second scenario the sender node “S” sends the packets to the receiver one “R.” 
In this case, the attacker “A” is located near the receiver node. Therefore, the sender “S” forwards the data packets to the both 
nodes “B” and “C” simultaneously.  
It is not important that the data packets forward to the receiver “R” by passing the rout which includes “B, E” or “C, 
F” because they must be forwarded by the attacker “A” to reach the receiver node “R” [17,19]. 
Rushing node at anywhere within the network 
In the last scenario that can be seen in the Figure 3, the attacker “A” can be everywhere in the network.  
will continue until the packets reach to the destination node “R” [17,19]. 
VI. A SUBSET OF PROPOSED DEFENSES AGAINST RUSHING ATTACKS  
In this section, we are going to describe some proposed methods against the Rushing attacks. Our guideline to reach this 
decryption is based on what Hu et al. proposed in [20]. Based on this evidence, a subset of three methods “Secure 
Neighbor Detection”, “Secure Route Delegation” and “Randomized ROUTE REQUEST Forwarding” as an 
integrated protocol, is able to prevent Rushing attack [20]. Our aim is to introduce some possible solutions against 
Rushing attacks to show a guideline for the beginners and we do not claim that these methods are the best,  
The subsections (6.1), (6.2), and (6.3) introduce the mentioned techniques. It can be deduced that the use of any 
mixed method can be used against Rushing attacks. 
A. Secure Neighbor Detection
As a simple scenario of the Rushing attack, the attacker forwards a ROUTE REQUEST upper than the normal radio 
transmission range (e.g. via using a higher gain antenna), thus she can suppress subsequent requests from this Route 
Discovery. In this case, both of the sender and the receiver entities, can verify that either other parties are within the 
normal direct wireless communication range by the use of secure Neighbor Detection method.  
In a Secure Neighbor Detection method, if two nodes are able to communicate because of being in the same maximum 
transmission range, they can detect each other as neighbors. Therefore, by the use of this technique the attacker is not able 
to introduce two nodes, which are not within the maximum transmission range as neighbors. Moreover, she is unable to 
show herself as a neighbor of another node without being able to hear the packets. 
B. Secure Route Delegation
In the SECURE ROUTE DELEGATION method, each node must be able to verify that all the Secure Neighbor 
Detection steps were done between any adjacent pair of nodes. To achieve this goal, Secure Route Delegation uses 
Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP). We can describe this method in a simple scenario; one node such as I1 
receives current ROUTE REQUEST (originating from Sender node of message destined for Receiver node) at first. Then 
I1 performs the secure neighboring detection and finds that I2 is a neighbor node. In this method, I1 delegates the ROUTE 
REQUEST to I2. Actually, I1 does not delegate the whole message, because I2 can reconstruct all the fields of the message 
and verify the signature. The ROUTE DELEGATION message can be packed with the last message of the 
Secure Neighbor Detection. If I2 believes that I1 is really a neighbor, he will accept the ROUTE DELEGATION and 
continue the protocol. Therefore, signs another ROUTE DELEGATION for the next neighbor. 
C. Randomized ROUTE REQUEST Forwarding
The Use of Secure Neighbor Detection and Secure Route Delegation techniques are not sufficient enough to defend 
against the Rushing attacks. The main reason is that an adversary can still get the advantage of ROUTE REQUEST. By 
the use of a random selection technique beside the two other mentioned ones, the chance of a Rushing adversary to 
dominate all returned routes will be minimized. In the traditional ROUTE REQUEST forwarding method, when a 
node receives the request, immediately forwards it and drops all subsequent ones. However, it is obvious that in 
Randomized ROUTE REQUEST Forwarding, when a node receives some ROUTE REQUEST messages, first gathers the 
number of them, then selects one of them randomly to forward. It is worth mentioning that two important factors that 
should be considered in this method are the amount of collected ROUTE REQUEST packets and the chosen timeout 
algorithm. 
VII. CONCLUSION
Because of special properties and requirements of mobile Ad-Hoc networks, it is very difficult to make them secure. In 
order to defend against existing attacks, many protocols offered by researchers but there are still many drawbacks. 
Rushing attacks are one of the common attacks in MANETs that utilize the duplicate suppression feature of routing 
protocols. In this paper, we reviewed a subset of proposed Rushing attacks. In addition, we reviewed a subset of 
proposed methods to prevent this kind of attacks. 
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